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A reduction  in average  tax rates  on U.S. investment  abroad  and
a relative shift of U.S. investment  toward industrial countries,
rather than developing  countries, suggests a tougher climate
ahead for developing  countres that  wish  to attract  foreign  direct
investment.
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Debt and Intwenaonal Finance
WPS  1180
This paper - a product of the Debt and International  Finance Division, International Economics
Department  - is part of a larger effort  in the  department  to study the effect of taxation  of foreign  direct
investment.  Copies  of the paper  are available  free from  the Worid  Bank, 1818  H Str_a NW,  Washington,
DC 20433. Please  contact Rose Vo, room S8-042,  extension  31047 (September  1993,  29 pages).
Huizinga  examines  the financing  of U.S. direct  * Debt finance  of direct investment  is becom-
investment  abroad.  Using a theoretical  model,  he  ing more  important  in industrial  countries  and
first examines  how home country  investors  can  less important  in developing  countries.
use debt finance  to reduce  their host country  tax
liability  and to reduce  the capital  investment  * The tax benefits  that .ndustrial  and develop-
distortion  attuibutable  to foreign  taxes.  ing countries  get from U.S. affiliates,  as mea-
sured by average  income and payroll tax rates,
Empirically,  U.S. affiliates  are shown  to use  ate waning.  The downward  trend in tax rates
leverage  in high tax environments  and in situa-  suggests  an increased  intemational  competition
tions where  the affiliates  face high foreign  wage  to attract  foreign  direct investment.
bills relative  to assets.  This confirms  the notion
that leverage  can be used to ward  off host  The reduction  in averag  tax rates  on U.S.
country  tax and wage pressures  on the firm.  investment  abroad  and the relative  shift toward
investment  in industrial  countries  suggests  a
Huizinga  examines  what characteristics  of  tougher  climate ahead  for developing  countries
foreign  direct investment  determine  the average  that wish  to attract  foreign  direct investment.
host country  tax rate paid. Generally,  the taxa-
tion of foreign  direct investment  is positively  One strategy  for attracting  foreign  invest-
related  to the ratio of a firm's plant and equip-  ment would  be to deepen  the domestic  financial
ment spending  to its assets,  and negatively  maket so a multinational  can atract additional
related  to the size of the wage bill. Host  coun-  lending  capital  in the host country  itself. Another
tries appear  to charge lower taxes  in cases where  approach  is local equity participation  in foreign
U.S. direct investors  abroad  pay high wage bills  direct investment  to lessen the incentives  for host
to labor within  the host country.  countries  to tax foreign  investments  highly.
Certain  trends emerge  from the data:
There  is a relative  shift  of U.S.  direct  invest-
ment  abroad  toward  the industrial  countries.
T'hePolicy  RsesrchlWorkingPaperSeriesdisseilnatesi efmdisofworkmderwayin  C  eBanknAteobjrveofteeses
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentatons  are less than fully polished. 'Me  fijidmgs, mlerretations,  and
conclusions in thiese  papers do not necessarily represent ofricial Bank policy.




This paper was written for the Debt and International Finance Division of the World
Bank. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank. I
thank Lans Bovenberg  and Antonio Estache for useful comments.1.  Introduction
With the decline in net direct lending to developing  countries in the 1980s, foreign direct
investment has  gained in  relative  importance as  a  source  of  funds  for  investment in
developing countries. Foreign direct investment itself, however, consists of debt as well as
equity finance. This paper examines the joint determination  of the affiliate's financing and in
particular its leverage decision and of the rate of foreign taxation on the affiliate.
A theoretical model first examines th.e relationship between leverage, physical capital
investment and taxation. The model is similar in spirit to  work, pioneered by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), that examines the implications of agency costs, stemming from conflicts
between shareholders and managers, for the firm's financial structure. The firm is assumed
to decide on its level of indebtedness  before the country determines the tax rate. Leverage is
thca shown to  moderate the level of taxation, as a highly leveraged firm cannot pay high
taxes without risking bankruptcy. The  tax  authority wishes to  prevent bankruptcy as  it
interrupts or  stops  the  payment of  tax.  The  model  is  an  application to  the  area  of
international taxation of  the general notion that debt finance reduces the ability of outside
agents to capture the return to the firm's assets. The implication of the model that leverage
moderates tax  payments  is  consistent with  the  internationally widespread income  tax
deductibility of interest. The idea that the firm's financing affects the tax system is opposite
to that of Hodder and Senbet (1990) who examine the firm's optimal global financing reacts
to the provision of the international  tax system.
The  empirical research focuses on  the  determination of  leverage and  host  country
taxation  for  the  case  of  U.S.  foreign  direct  investment abroad.  The  data  is  at  most
disaggregated at  the  combined country and industry level.  Debt finance is  shown to  be
relatively important for U.S. affiliates  in developed  countries. Consistent with the theoretical
model, leverage is positively related to  the average tax rate.  For  the developed countries
leverage is  further positively related to  the wage bill relative to  sets in  a  country-level
regression. This suggests that firms can use leverage to lessen pressures from tax authorities
as well as from labor. For the developing  countries, however, leverage does not appear to be2
related to the tax and wage variables.  Apparently  for these affiliates  bankruptcy  is not an
effective  device  for firms  to moderate  tax and wage  pressures.
The multinational  firm's international  leverage  decision  is related  to its choices  regarding
the extent  and form of repatriated  earnings.  Earnings  generally  can be retained,  or repatriated
in the form of dividends,  interest, royalties,  etc. U.S. multinationals'  earnings  repatriation
decisions  have been a focus of previous  empirical  research. Kopits  (1972)  offers an early
study that estimates  dividend  payout equations  for subsidiaries  to their U.S. parents using
U.S. tax data aggregated  at the country  level. Hines  and Hubbard  (1990)  and Altschuler  and
Newlon  (1991) recently  exaniined  the impact of tax price effects on repatriation  behavior
using micro data,  which makes it  possible to  examine the  role of  parent company
characteristics  in the determination  of repatriation  behavior.
A second empirical  question  the paper addresses  is, what direct investment  characte-
ristics affect the host country rate of taxation?  In  this regard, the paper examines  two
measures  of the average  tax rate: (i) income  and payroll  taxes  over assets  and (ii) all taxes  on
the foreign  establishment  over assets. For the developed  countries,  it is the first tax rate that
appears  to reflect  the characteristics  of the foreign  investment.  In particular,  the average  tax
rate is positively related to the ratio of plant and equipment  expenditure  to assets, and
negatively  to wages  over assets. Apparently,  the immobility  of plant and equ  pment makes  it
easier for the tax authority  to tax these assets. The latter relationship  suggests  that tax
authorities  to some extent undo the claims that organized  labor lays on the returns to an
affiliate's  capital. For the developing  countries  it is the second  measure  of taxation,  i.e. the
ratio of all taxes to assets, that responds  to the measures  of the plant and equipment  and the
wage bill.  Finally, for developed  and developing  countries, alike industry-effects  are
important.  In particular,  the petroleum  industry  is taxed  the most  reladve  to other industries.
The remainder  of this paper is organized  as follows.  Section  2 sets out the theoretical
model  of the relationship  between  leverage  and foreign  taxation.  Secdon  3 discusses  the data
and  presents some regression results regarding leverage and taxation and Section 4
concludes.3
2.  The Model
This section  presents  a model  of the role of debt finance  in determining  the level of host
country taxation  on foreign direct investments.  The country is assumed to be unable to
announce  a rate of taxation that will hold regardless  of the firm leverage  decision. Host
country  taxation  then will be responsive  to firm leverage.  The model  is co-  sistent  with, and
rationalizes  the deductibility  of interest  expenses  from taxable  income  in many  countries.  The
host country  income tax, throughout,  is assumed  to be the effective  marginal  tax on host
country  income.  This is correct,  if the multinational  firm does not repatriate  any earnings  or
if cannot obtain double taxation  relief for host country taxes from its home country, for
instance,  it is in an excess  credit  position.
The model  considers  a sirngle  home country  firm engaged  in foreign  direct investment.
Each period the direct investor decides  on the quantity of a  single  factor of production,
denoted  K, to be employed.  K can generally  be working  capital,  longer-term  capital  or labor.
In what follows,  K is referred  to as rapital. The cost of capital,  K, per period is denoted  r.
Output per period is equal to f(K) +  Z, where Z  is a random profitability  shock.I In
particular,  Z is a random  variable  on the interval [z,ZJ, with density  g(Z) and a correspon-
ding  distribution  function  G(Z).  The host country  taxes  the firm's output  at a rate r. The cost
of hiring the factor  K is not deductible  from host country  taxable  income,  and hence the tax
levied by the host country  distorts the capital  invesAsient.  The firm carries debt which all
matures  in a single  period. The total payment,  in units of output, due to creditors  at the end
of the period is denoted  D. The host country tax authority  is assumed to be the senior
creditor. Net-of-tax  output is also always assumed  to be sufficient  to pay for the cost of
capital.
Generally,  we will ass, -ne  that there are costs of bankruptcy.  The frm's  scrap  value, S,
is, therefore,  generally  less than its no-bankruptcy  value.  The firm's value  is the value  of all
the debt and equity claims  on the firm's output, given the firm is presently  not bankrupt.
Bankruptcy  is assumed  to occur if the combined  present  period claims  of the tax authority,
the suppliers  of capital,  and the debt holders  exceed  the present  value  of firm's scrap value,4
S, which  will be fuUy  realized  ond peri6d'after  bankruptby.rBa'kiiptcy,  specifically,  occurs
if z  :  2,  where he threshold  2  is given  implicitly  by
(1  - r)(f(K)  +  - rK  +  - a  D  (1)
The firm's debt is assumed  to be held by many  creditors.  In principle  at the end of each
period  an individual  creditor  can decide  to roll over the debt or to demand  full payment.  If
all creditors  believe  bankruptcy  is determir.,n  according  to (1) then it is rational  to demand
full payment  on the debt in bankruptcy  states  according  to (1), and to be wiUing  to roll over
the debt in non-bankruptcy  states. The bankruptcy  rule (1), therefore, can be seen as a
possible outcome in an environment  where creditors do not coordinate  their actions. Of
course with 2  <  Z,  bankruptcy  cannot occur. Given the bankruptcy  rule of (1), the per
period  probability  of bankruptcy  is given  by Gt±).
The value of the firm, before the profitability  shock Z  is known, is  given by the
expected  net revenues  this period  plus the discounted  value  of the firm next period, expected
across bankruptcy  and non-bankruptcy  states.  Formally,  the value  of the firm, denoted  V, is
given by
4 = V  +  + G(C  (2) 1 +r
where
V  - (1  - r)(f(K)  + EZ)  - rK
and where  EZ is the expected  value  of the productivity  shock  Z.
In (2), V is the expected  a.  ie of per period  net-of-tax  operating  profits. C is the cost  of
bankruptcy,  given as the difference  between  the value  of the firm in case of solvency  and the
scrap  value  of the firm.5
Equation  (2) can be solved  for the fmn's value  +  as follows
[kL  v  - C0(G  (3)
[  r  ]  ~r G(Z)(3
Let us now consider  the objective  of the host country's taxation authority.  We will
simply  assume  the country  is interested  in maximizing  the present  discounted  value  of its tax
receipts.  The model thus sidesteps  other possible  government  objectives  such as the creation
of consumer  surpluys,  labor rents or of technological  spillovers.3  The size of tax receipts  in
the current  period  are uncertain,  as there is a random  profitability  shock  Z. The tax authori-
ty, howe-ver,  is the firm's most senior  creditor,  and receives  at least some tax revenues  this
period. With bankruptcy  the firm is liquidated  so that tax payments  cease  altogether.  This is
of course  an extreme  assumption.  We could assume,  instead,  that following  bankruptcy  the
firm can be restructured  after some time. In the latter case, productio.i  as well as tax
payments  are halted  only for some  periods  following  bankruptcy.
Let T be the host  country's  expected  tax receipts  per period  if production  tk  place. T
is given  by
T  =  r(f(K) + EZ)  (4)
The expected  discounted  value of the country's  present  and future tax receipts  is then
given by
lIr  T  (5)
r  + G(Z)
Before we focus on the firm's and tax autiority's decision making in detail, it is
important  to be clear about the exact  order  of events.  We assume  that, first, the firm sets the
value  of its debt D due at the end of the current  period. Second,  the tax authority  selects  the
income tax rate r.4 Third, the firm decides  on how much  capital  K to employ.  Fourth, the6
firm and the country observe the profitability  shock Z.  i  fth, the debt holders receive
payments  for their debts, and in the case of bankruptcy,  for-ijose on the firm. As is usual,
we have to consider  the outcomes  of these decisions  in a backward  fashion.  The bankruptcy
decision  is of course immediate  for Z  ￿  Z,with Z as in (1). What  remains  is to consider
the firm's capital  investment  decision  and t'e country's  taxation  ev.-F.on  in turn.
The Capital  Investment  Decision
At the investment  stage, the firn's managers  are assumed  to be interested  in maximizing
the return to shareholders,  rather than the value of the finn. The return to shareholders
consists of  expected net operating  profits this period after debt repayment,  in case of
solvency,  and the expected  value of the firm next period. In particular, the firm's v.lue to
shareholders,  V,, is given  by
(,=  ([(1  -r)(f(K)  +Z)  - rK -D]g(Z)dZ  +  I  G(Z) t  (6
J  1 ~~~~~~+r
Note, that as the profitability  shock Z is additive,  there is no conflict  at the capital
investment  stage  between  shareholders  and debt holders.
The optimal  investment  level is given by the requirement  that the net-of-tax  return to
capital  equals  its opportunity  cost  as follows
(1 - r)f'(K)  = r  (7)
Implicit  in (7) is that investment  K decreases  with the tax rate r.
The Tax  Setting  Decision
The host country tax authority  sets the tax rate T  so as to maximize  the discounted
stream  of tax revenues  T in (5). The tax authority  takes  the negative  relationship  between  the
tax rate r  and investment  K implicit  in (7) as given. The optimality  condition  is found  by7
differentiating  (5) with  respect  to 7 as follows
dT  Tg(±).dZ'=o  (8)
dr  r +G(Z)  Ci
with
Z  for Z  Z
=ZforZ  <  Z
- for >  Z
such  that
'Z=  f(K) +  fZS  Z
dlr  I  - r 
= 0 otherwise
First, note that for the case where the tax setting  does not affect the probability  of
bankruptcy, i.e  dZ'/dr  = 0, equation (8) implies dT/dr  =  0 which means the tax authority
maximizes  current  tax revenues  T. For the case where  the tax rate does affect  the probability
of bankruptcy,  we have d Z'/dr  = (f(K) + 2)/(l  - T)  >  0.  Li this case (8) implies that
optimally  dT/dr >  0, which  implies  the tax rate is optimally  chosen  to be below  the tax rate
that maximizes  current  tax revenues.
The Leverage  Decision
Finally, we have to examine  the firm's borrowing  decision. In particular, the firm
chooses  the value  of its debt D so as to maximize  the value  of the firm in (3). Differentiating
(3) with respect  to D gives  us the following  optimality  condition
1 + rl  dV dr  _  Cg(2)  + dZ'  dT  =  (dl
r  J  dr dD  r  LdD  dr  dDJ8
with
dVt  -f(K) - EZ  <  0
and
dZ  '  1 for Z  5  25Z
0 otherwise
and dZ'/dr  as in (8).
The first term in  (9) is  the impact of  leverage, via the tax rate,  on current after-tax
operating profits. The second term reflects that levrage  affects the probability of bankruptcy
directly and also through its effect on the tax rate r. Important in (9) is the induced effect of
leverage on the tax rate, i.e.  dr/dD. The sign of dr/dD is generally ambiguous. Specifically,
for very low levels or high levels of debt, we have dr/dD  =  0, as in  diese cases the firm
will go bankrupt with probabilities  zero and one respectively. In either case, the optimal tax
rate  from  the  tax  authority's  perspective will  not  be  affected  by  a  small  change in
indebtedness,  D, by the firm.
What we wish to show, however, is that debt finance can always be used to lower the
host country tax rate below the no leverage tax rate. To see this, let  ;  and K' be the tax rate
and capital investment, respectively, such that current tax revenues are maximized. The tax
rate imposed in the absence of debt finance is  r.  Let De be the highest level of debt such
that with 7  =  7e and K =  K'  there is no probability of bankruptcy. This means that D  is
given as follows
(1  -)(f(K)  + O  - rK  -S  = D  (10)
I +r9
Now  let  us  consider  a  small increase in  the  firm's  indebtedness beyond D*. This
increased indebtedness  introduces the possibility of bankruptcy  as now  dZ'/dD  - 1.  Also,
we now have dZ'/dT  >  0.  This means that from (8) the host country govemment has to
lower its tax rate below i.  Lowering T below i  has only a second order negative impact on
current tax revenues as dT/d;  =  C, but a first order effect in reducing the probability of
bankruptcy. As  a  result,  the  iovernment optimally lowers its  tax  rate  to  eliminate the
probability of  bankruptcy entirely.  Increasing D  slightly beyond D,  therefore, does not
introduce a probability of bankruptcy at all once the lower tax rate is taken into account.
From (7) we know that the lower tax rate causes an increase in investment K. The net effect
of this is,  that with the lowier tax rate and higher investment, there is only a second order
negative impact on tax revenues. In sum, ieveiage can be used to lower the tax rate, increase
investment and the value of the firm, with a negligible impact on tax revenues and no ch,je
in the probability of bankruptcy. This result does not depend on the magnitudc  of the cost of
bankruptcy. The argument goes through, therefore, even if bankruptcy  costs are very large.
The argument so far has been that some debt finance can always be used to lower host
country income taxes on foreigr. direct invest...ent regardless of the presence of bankruptcy
costs. Of course, the optimal level of debt finance generally does depend on the existence of
bankruptcy costs. Specifically,  the presence of high bankruptcy  costs should reduce the case
for debt finance as a means of lowering the firm's tax liability. This generally produces an
optimal interior level of debt finance. Interestingly, however, the optimal use of debt finance
in the absence of bankruptcy costs is, also, generally interior. Specifically,  in the absence of
bankruptcy costs leverage should be chosen so as  to render the probability of  bankruptc<y
very senstive to the tax rate.  The expected present value of future tax revenues are  then,
also, very sensitive to the tax rate, and the authorities face a large incentive to lower the tax
rate.
The financing choice highlighted above is  the  use of  debt finance. A  separate, and
perhaps equally important aspect,  is  the  national source of  all  types of  financing. The
international ownership structure of a foreign affiliate affects the country's taxation decision10
as the country, other things equal, is more interested in taxing foreign citizens than its own
citizens.5  Knowing this, firms have an incentive to indigenize their operations by borrowing
in  the country of  location as  well as by  selling equity shares to  local investors. Bradley
(1977)  mentions divestment to  local investors  as  a  strategy for  multinationals against
expropriation. Host countries generally have an incentive to facilitate  this process as it forces
foreign firms to divest partially. Regulation of this kind is desirable if the foreign investors
indi-vi-ually  are  too insignificant to  influence the rate  of  taxation of  foreign investments.
Ownership restrictions of  this variety allow a host country to precommit to a  low rate of
taxation on  foreign investment ex post.  Such restrictions potentially benefit all parties, as
they can simultaneously  increase host country tax receipts, foreign capital investments and
after-tax value of the home country's foreign investments.  Ownership restrictions are a policy
prevalent in many countries.
Ownership restrictions alter the interaction between the affiliate and the parent, as well
as between the affiliate and the host country tax authority. The former aspect of ownership
restrictions  is  examined  by  Katrak  (1983).  In  this  regard,  ownership restrictions are
undesirable if they induce the multinational  firms to transfer profitable activities back to the
parent or to subsidiaries  in other locations.
3. The Evidence
The  Data
The  U.S.  Commerce  Department collects  data  separately for  majority-owned and
minority-owned  U.S.  affiliates abroad. Data collection for majority-owned  affiliates tends to
be  more detailed. Data is  further collected separately for bpuik and  non-bank affiliates.
Reflecting data availability and  the interest of  this  study, all  data  in  this paper  are  for
majority-owned  non-bank U. S. affiliates  abroad.
The U.S.  Commeice Department has covered virtually all  affiliates in  its benchmark
surveys of 1977, 1982  and 1989. The 1977  and 1982 survey data at this point are available in
final revised form, while the 1989  data are currently available only in preliminary form. As a11
result, most of the information  in this paper and in particular the regression analysis is based
on  the  1982 benchmark survey.  During non-survey years,  the  Department collects less
extensive information from smaller samples of  affiliates. The results of these surveys are
eiailable in revised form up to 1988.
Table  1 first reports how the size of U.S.  foreign direct investment, as  measured by
assets,  has  changed during the  1980s. It  shows that U.S.  investment in  the  developed
countries more than doubled in assets from 1982 to 1989, which amounts to an increase in
real terms of around 58 per cent. U.S. direct investments  in the developing  countries instead
declined by around 6 per cent in real terms.' This evidence shows that, at least for U.S.
foreign direct investment, there has been a trend towards relatively less investment in  the
developing countries.
Table 2 provides information on  trends regarding the tax and employee compensation
benefits host countries receive from U.S.  foreign investment. The T/A and T/I variable are
host country income plus payroll taxes over assets and over before-foreign-tax  income (and
also before interest is deducted). Interestingly, for developed  and developing  countries alike,
tax  revenues as  a  percentage of assets, as  well as  before-tax income, have declined. In
absolute terms,  tax revenues have increased from $17.3 billion ir. 1982 to $20.2 billion in
1989 for the developed countries, while they have declined from $12.7 billion to $8.4 billion
for the developing countries. The general decline in tax rates, and in absolute tax revenues
for dhe  developing  countries, suggests that tax competition  to attract foreign direct investment
has become fiercer in the 1980s. The L/A variable measures affiliate liabilities divided by
assets. The table shows that this ratio has increased somewhat from 0.63  to 0.65 for the
developed  countries, while it has declined from 0.58 to 0.49 for the developing  countries. In
this  respect investments in  developed and  developing countries are  thus becoming more
dissimilar. P EXP/A stands for plant and equipment  expenditures  divided by assets. Here the
ratio has declined for the developed  countries, from 0.30 in 1982  to 0.23 in 1989, while it has
increased from 0.19 to 0.23 for the developing  countries. These trends suggest a general shift
of plant and equipment from developed  countries to developing  countries. The W/A variable12
stands for total employee compensation divided by -assets. This  measure-  of  host country
compensation has declined for developed and developing countries alike. The tax and wage
data  together  suggest host  countries, and  especially developing countries,  are  receiving
progressively  fewer direct benefits from the presence  of foreign direct investment.
Table 3 provides information  on how U.S. foreign direct investment differed by industry
for 1982. First, payroll and income tax rates are highest in the petroleum industry, followed
by manufacturing  and wholesale. Lowest taxes are paid by the finance and service industries.
The least leveraged industry is  manufacturing, while the most highly leveraged is finance.
High-tax industries tend to have high plant and equipment  expenditures as a share of assets.
Apparently, the presence of fixed capital assets enables tax authorities to raise the average
rate of taxation. High tax payments also appear to coexist with high employee compensation
relative to  assets.  Apparently, the  same factors that  allow tax authorities to  extract  tax
payments allow labor to bargain for its compensation. Secondly, the last column provides
information on research intensity, as measured by the volume of research and development
expenditure for the affiliate divided by affiliate assets. 7 The manufacturing  industry is shown
to be the most research intensive.
Of course, the information, as presented in the table, does not allow us to infer precisely
the relationships between financial structure and  taxation. To address these questions, we
next present the results of regressions  that attempt to explain the financial structure choice of
the U.S. multinational,  on the one hand, and the country's taxation decision on the other.
Regression  Results
To start, Tables 4 and 5 examine the leverage decision for U.S.  foreign affiliates. I The
regressions in  Table 4 result from ordinary least squares. The country's taxation decision,
however, is argued in Section 2 to be endogenous  to the firm's leverage d&csion. To adjust
for  this,  Table 5  reports  two-stage-least-squares  regression results,  where the  P  EXP/A
variable is used as the instrument for the T/A variable. The data are aggregated to the host
country level. The dependent variable is the ratio of affiliate liabilities to assets. Column 113
includes all countries  in the sample, while columns  2 and 3 are for the developed  anu
developing  countries  separately.  The results  in the two tables  are very similar.
Overall  it appears  that higher  average  taxes induce  U.S. firms to increase  leverage,  at
least for developed  countries.  This is consistent  with the theoretical  model,  but also with the
simple rule of  the deductibility  of  interest from taxable corporate income. The other
generally  significant  variable  is the wage  bill to assets  ratio--W/A.  Higher  em;ioyee  compen-
sation  relative  to assets  is thus associated  with higher  leverage.  An explanation  is that firms
use leverage  to reduce  the firm's free cash flow which  can be captured  by organized  labor.'
The higher  is employee  compensation,  the higher  are the firms' incentives  to use leverage  to
reduce  labor's scope for increasing  demands  for compensation.  Note that in both Tables  4
and 5 the regressions  appear to explain  leverage  fairly well for the developed  countries  but
not so well for the developing  countries.
Regression  results regarding  the firm's leverage  decision  with data disaggregated  at the
country  and industry  level are reported  in Table  6. The industry  dummies  12 through  16 are
included  to examine  fixed industry  effects.  The base industry  is the petroleum  industry.  The
host country tax and wage pressure variables  are significant  as  before, at least for the
developed  countries.  Plant and equipment,  proxied  by the P EXP/A  variable, is associated
with less debt and thus  more equity  finance. 10 The 15 and 16  dummies  are significant  for the
developed  countries, meaning that the services and other industries categories  use less
leverage.
Next we turn to the results  of regressions  explaining  the host country's  taxation  decision.
The regressions  reported  in Table 7 again  are for data aggregated  at the host country. The
dependent  variable is the ratio of income and payroll taxes to assets. The advantage  of
deflating  tax revenues  by assets rather than income  is that it sidesteps  issues of defining
income.  Deflating  tax revenues  by assets  is, also, consistent  with the definitions  of the right-
hand-side  variables  in the regressions.  The theory suggests  the L/A variable  is not a truly
exogenous  variable,  and the variable  is left out. The P EXP/A  variable  enters significantly14
throughout, while the W/A variable is negative and significant for the group of developed
countries only. The generally better fit for the developed countries suggests that at  least
payroll and  income taxes reflect foreign direct investment characteristics foremost in  the
developed  countries.
As an alternative to the income and payroll tax measure, we can define the average tax
rate,  as all  host country taxes on  the U.S.  foreign establishment divided by  assets. This
measure of taxation possibly reflects sales taxes, export taxes and tax-like user fees as well
income and payroll taxes. Table 8 presents regressions of this alternative average tax rate
using country data. Interestingly, the all-inclusive  tax rate regression does well only for the
group of developing countries. It appears, therefore, that the developing countries use non-
income and payroll  taxes to  establish the  desired effective rate  of  tax  on  foreign direct
investment. The relative  responsiveness of  non-income and  payroll  taxes  in  developing
countries to foreign direct investment cannot be a consequence  of their overall heavier use in
the developing countries, as the average non-income  and payroll tax in developing countries
is around 6 per cent in  the developing countries, while it is  11 per cent in  the developed
countries.
4. Conclusion
This paper has examined the financing  of U.S. direct investment abroad. The financing
decision has been examined in  conjunction with the host country's problem of  taxing the
foreign direct investment. Host country taxation and wage pressure variables are shown to be
important for the determination of affiliate leverage only for the developed countries. U.S.
direct investment in developing countries is generally more equity-financed  than investment
in the developed countries. In the case of developing  countries, the threat of bankruptcy may
therefore be small, and debt finance cannot be effectively used by the firm to lower tax and
wage pressures. A reason for the relatively unimportant  debt finance in developing countries
can be the lower level of development  of intemal credit markets."15
Average payroll and income rates of  taxation differ widely across industries, with the
petroleum industry being taxed the highest, followed by manufacturing  and wholesale. The
petroleum industry also pays the highest non-income  and payroll tax taxes.1 2 The finance and
services industries, on the other hand, face lower tax rates. Consistent with these stylized
facts, the ratio of plant and equipment expenditures to assets positively affects the average
rate of  taxation. At  the same time, host countries appear to charge lower taxes in  cases
where U.S. direct investors abroad pay high wage bills to labor within the host country. In
developing countries, non-income and payroll taxes appear to respond relatively strongly to
the qualitative  nature of U.S. direct investment  abroad.
Two main trends emerge from the data. First,  there is a  relative shift of  U.S.  direct
investment  abroad towards the developed  countries. Second, debt finance of direct investment
is  becoming more  important in  developed countries and  less  important in  developing
countries. More importantly, the tax benefits that developed  and developing  countries obtain
from U.S.  affiliates, as  measured by  average income and payroll tax  rates,  are  waning.
Average tax rates on U.S. investments in developing  countries dropped discretely in 1986 at
the time of the U.S.  Tax Reform Act. The decline in the developed countries, however, has
been  more gradual.  The  downward trend in  tax  rates  suggests that  there  is  increased
international tax  competition to  attract foreign direct investment. Income and payroll tax
revenues that developing countries derive from U.S.  investment have been also declining in
absolute terms. The wage bill relative to assets that U.S.  firms abroad have been paying has
also been declining. Of course, tax and wage benefits are not all  that multinationals  can
contribute to a host country. Also of importance  are the introduction  of new products and the
transfers of new technologies. The relative.  shift of plant and equipment expenditures from
developed to developing countries suggests that the transfer of production technologies  to the
developing  countries is on the increase.
The reduction in  average tax rates on  U.S.  investment abroad and  the relative shift
towards investment in  the  developed countries suggests a  relatively tougher climate for
developing countries that wish to attract foreign direct investment. In order to successfully16
attract foreign investments,  developing  countries can develop various strategies.
The theoretical analysis suggests that more plentiful borrowings by  the  multinational
allow the multinational  to reduce the effective rate of taxation on foreign direct investment.
One approach, therefore, is to deepen the domestic financial  market to enable a multinational
to attract additional lending capital in the host country itself. In this regard the existence of
financial intermediaries  that can channel loral savings to international companies and a legal
framework that protects the rights of lenders are important.
Along similar lines, local equity participation  in foreign direct investment should lessen
the incentives for host countries to tax foreign investments highly ex post. Indigenization  of
the ownership of  foreign affiliates can be encouraged by way of regulation, as is done in
many countries that have restrictions on the foreign ownership of domestic firms or affiliates.
In this regard, ownership restrictions may have a useful role to play in environments  where
countries cannot commit to the effective  rates of taxation on future foreign direct investment.
Ownership restrictions are a trade-related  investment measure that is subject to negotiation  in
the current GAIT  round. In these negotiations,  the United States has generally advocated  the
proscription of this and other trade-related  investment  restrictions.' 3An empirical investigation
of  the  relevance of  international ownership patterns in  the  determination of  the  rate  of
taxation on  international investments would be  an  interesting research step to  consider.
Unfortunately, published data on the international  ownership of foreign investments  by U.S.
parents is only available at a highly aggregated level, which makes a careful examination of
this link rather difficult.17
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Appendix
Variable  Definitions
A  =  total affiliate  assets
Dev  =  dummy  variable,  equal  to 1 for a developed  country  and 0 otherwise
I  =  affiliate  income,  computed  as the sum of net income inclusive  of foreign  income
taxes, plus  the U.S. prime  rate times  subsidiary  liabilities
I2  =  dummy  variable,  equal  to 1 for the manufacturing  industry  and 0 otherwise
13  =  dummy  variable,  equal  to 1 for the wholesale  industry  and 0 otherwise
14  =  dummy variable, equal to  1 for  the industry of  finance (except banking),
insurance  and real estate  and 0 otherwise
I5  =  dummy  variable,  equal  to 1 for the services  industry  and 0 otherwise
I6  =  dummy  variable,  equal to 1 for the category  of other industries  and 0 otherwise.
These are industries  other than the petroleum  industries  and industries  denoted  by
the variables 12  - I5.
L  =  total affiliate  liabilities
P Exp =  plant and equipment  expenditures  by affiliate20
R  =  expenditure  for research and development  performed for affiliate
by parent
T  =  foreign income taxes of affiliate
W  =  employee  compensation  of affiliate
Data Sources:
United States Direct Investment  Abroad: 1982  Benchmark  Survey Data, 1985.
United States Direct Investment Abroad: Operations of United States Parent Companies and
their Foreign Affiliates:
Revised 1983  Estimates
Revised 1984  Estimates
Revised 1985  Estimates
Revised 1986  Estimates
Revised 1987  Estimates
Revised 1988  Estimates
United  States Direct  Investment Abroad:  1989 Benchmark Survey,  Preliminary Results,
1991.
All  of  the  above  publications are  published by  the  U.S.  Department of  Commerce,
Washington,  D.C.  Finally,  data  on  U.S.  prime  interest  rates  were  taken  from  the
International  Financial Statistics  of the International  Monetary Fund.21
TABLE 1. ASSETS  OF U.S. AFFILIATES  ABROAD (U.S. $ BILLIONS).
]2evelg=d  Developing
Countries  Countries
1982  144.3  179.7
1983  144.3  187.6
1984  147.6  199.5
1985  166.5  200.4
1986  194.5  197.6
1987  242.5  206.7
1988  258.5  202.6
1989  293.2  218.0
See the Appendix for data sources.22
TABLE 2. A COMPARISON  OF U.S. DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
IN DEVtELOPED  AND DEVELOPING  COUNTRIS.
Developed  Countdes
ILA  ia  P  WMA
1982  0.04  0.26  0.63  0.30  0.18
1983  0.05  0.28  0.62  0.29  0.17
1984  0.05  0.28  0.62  0.28  0.22
1985  0.05  0.28  0.63  0.27  0.15
1986  0.05  0.26  0.63  0.26  0.15
1987  0.03  0.22  0.62  0.24  0.14
1988  0.03  0.19  0.65  0.24  0.14
1989  0.02  0.15  0.65  0.23  0.13
Developing  Countries
T/A  mI  LA  PEXPA  WLA
1982  0.07  0.32  0.58  0.19  0.16
1983  0.06  0.39  0.44  0.22  0.14
1984  0.07  0.34  0.55  0.21  0.17
1985  0.06  0.35  0.54  0.21  0.12
1986  0.03  0.25  0.51  0.21  0.13
1987  0.04  0.26  0.50  0.20  0.12
1988  0.04  0.24  0.49  0.20  0.12
1989  0.04  0.22  0.49  0.23  0.12
See the Appendix for variable definitions  and data sources.23
TABLE 3. MEAN INDUSTRY  CHARACTERISTICS  ACROS., COUNTRIES--1982.
L  TI  LLA  P EXP/A  WIA
RLA
All industries  0.07  0.24  0.60  0.09  0.15
0.004
Petroleum  0.10  0.27  0.64  0.14  0.08
0.001
Manufacturing  0.04  0.24  0.59  0.08  0.24
0.009
Wh,olesale  0.05  0.22  0.64  0.08  0.18
0.002




Services  0.03  0.15  0.67  0.10  0.29
0.002
Other Industries  0.03  0.16  0.64  0.07  0.25
0.001
See Appendix for variable definitions  and the data source.24
TABLE 4. LEVERAGE  REGRESSIONS  BY COUNTRY:'  OLS.
All Countries  Deeped  Devloping
Countries  Counie
(1)  (2)  (3)
C  0.439  0.331  0.475
(0.056)**  (.065)**  (.083)**
T/A  0.463  1.649*  0.380
(.316)  (.708)  (.422)
P EXP/A  0.139  0.418  -0.088
(.435)  (.731)  (.617)
W/A  1.017  1.360  1.109
(.387)**  (.446)**  (.770)
R/A  -8.225  -7.946  -18.879
(6.913)  (5.256)  (29.201)
DEV  0.031
(.051)
0.26  0.63  0.17
N43  22  21
Note: The dependent  variable is the ratio of liabilities  to assets. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. * and ** denote significance  at the 5 and  1 percent levels respectively.
See Appendix for variable definitions  and the data source.25
TABLE 5. LEVERAGE  REGRLESSIONS  BY COUNTRY:  2SLS.
All Countries  Developed  Developing
Countries  Countries
(1)  (2)  (3)
C  0.423  0.355  0.457
(.067)**  (.078)**  (.086)
T/A  0.666  2.055  0.404
(.422)  (.710)**  (.512)
W/A  0.901  1.450  0.738
(.290)**  (.380)**  (.385)
R/A  -6.437  -10.138  0.671




2 0.22  0.47  0.18
N  47  23  24
Notes as for Table 5.26
TABLE 6. LEVERAGE  RBEGRESSIONS  BY COUNTRY  AND INDUSTRY:
OLS.
All Counbdes  Developed  Developing
Countries  Countries
(1)  (2)  (3)
C  0.589  0.573  0.578
(.072)**  (.063)**  (.136)
T/A  0.423  1.738  0.281
(.333)  (.572)**  (.473)
P EXP/A  -0.085  -0.777*  0.077
(.277)  (.395)  (.404)
W/A  0.420  0.831**  0.086
(.195)*  (.202)  (.375)
R/A  -0.004  -4.296  2.009
(2.801)  (4.305)  (4.625)
DEV  -0.004
(.039)
12  -0.114  -0.168  -0.012
(.083)  (.095)  (.151)
13  -0.049  -0.082  -0.037
(.076)  (.072)  (.146)
14  0.024  0.056  (0.013)
(.076)  (.073)  (.148)
I5  -0.057  -0.212  0.031
(.085)  (.092)*  (.150)
16  -0.113  -0.260  0.061
(.100)  (.091)**  (.201)
0.06  0.34  0.03
N  147  75  72
Notes as for Table 5.27
TABLE 7. TAX RATE REGRESSIONS  BY COUNTRY: OLS.
All countries  Ielp  D.lying
Cmntrie  Countrie
(1)  (2)  (3)
C  0.032  0.029  0.033
(.028)  (.020)  (.047)
P EXP/A  0.826  0.761  0.892
(.179)  (.165)e  (.289)*
W/A  -0.431  -0.386  -0.460
(.186)  (.117)  (.427)
R/A  3.429  3.016  3.919
(3.51)  (1.599)  (16.727)
DEV  -0.002
(.026)
0.40  0.59  0.35
N  43  22  21
Note:  The dependent variable is the ratio of foreign income and payroll taxes to assets. *
and ** denote significance  at the 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. See the Appen-
dix for variable  definitions  and for the data source.28
TABLE  8. INCLUSIVE  TAX  RATE  REGRESSIONS  BY COUNTRY:  OLS.
AILCQountIes  rkaloe  Dad
Counres  Countie
(1)  (2)  (3)
C,  0.049  0.068  0.071
(.045)  (.091)  (.043)
P EXP/A  1.034  0.979  1.168
(.286)"  (1.332)  (.265)Y
W/A  -0.046  0.325  -0.823
(.298)  (0.524)  (.392)
RWA  3.953  -1.035  39.569
(5.620)  (7.139)  (15.348)
DEV  0.048
(.042)
R  2 0.29  0.15  0.56
N  43  22  21
Note:  The dependent  variable  is the ratio of all foreign  taxes to assets. * and ** denote
significance  of the 5 and 1 percent  levels  respectively.  See the Appendix  for variable
definitions.29
ENDNOTES
1.  The function f(K) is concave with properties f'  >  0, f"  <  0, f'(O) =  co, f'(oo) =  0.
2.  In equation  (1), the scrap  value S is discounted,  as this scrap value  is realized  after a
period.
3.  In the present model, maximizing  the present  value of tax revenues  is consistent  with
maximizing  the present  value  of national  income.
4.  If the order of these first two events  is reversed,  then leverage  no longer  influences  the
firm's tax liability.  In fact, in this case the tax authorities'  objective  collapses  to a problem
of static  revenue  maximization,  and there will  be no debt finance.
5.  This is the case, as domestic  taxation  other  than through  incentive  effects  does not add to
national  income.
6.  The developed  countries  are Canada,  Europe,  Japan,  Australia,  New Zealand  and South
Africa.
7.  Eaton and Gersowitz  (1984)  indicate  that knowledge  and management  services  provided
to the affiliate  by the parent  affect  the country's  taxation  or expropriation  decision.
8.  The regression  for the deve;oping  countries  does not change  materially  if the average  tax
rte  is computed  as all host  country  taxes  on the firm divided  by assets.
9.  Of course, there are other possible  explanations  of a positive  correlation  between  the
wage  bill and leverage.  For instance,  a firm that increases  the rate of capacity  utilization  may
simultaneously  pay  more in  wages and borrow more to  finance additional non-labor
production  inputs.
10.  A potential  explanation  is that the risk taking  incentive  problems  associated  with debt
finance  are less easily  monitored  for firms  with  much  plant  and equipment.
11.  Also, the rates of inflation  and indexation  provisions  that affect the tax advantages  of
debt finance  differ  across  groups  of countries.
12. The petroleum  industry  pays on average  31 per cent of assets  in non-income  and payroll
taxes  per year in the petroleum  producing  countries.  The average  non-income  and payroll  tax
is around  9 per cent  of assets  per year.
13. See Graham and Krugman (1990).Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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